Why do equity and credit markets not behave as if they are integrated? We examine whether limits to arbitrage help explain why equity and credit markets are not highly correlated. We find that the cross-sectional variation in the level of integration between the equity and the credit default swap market is related to a range of proxies for informational sensitivity, liquidity, and idiosyncratic risk. Equity and credit markets are more integrated when a firm's securities are more informationally sensitive, are more liquid and have lower idiosyncratic risk.
Introduction
The primary insight of Merton's (1974) structural model of credit risk is that stocks and bonds are contingent claims on the underlying firm, and, therefore, stock returns and changes in credit spreads must be precisely related to ensure the absence of arbitrage.
It is thus not surprising that hedge funds and private equity firms are active in a variety of trading strategies -popularly known as capital structure arbitrage -that attempt to "arbitrage" across equity and credit markets. For instance, an article in the Wall Street Journal 1 comments on private equity deals:
Compare junk-bond yields to the earnings yields on stocks, and it seems like stocks are incredibly cheap. "Look at the valuations in the two markets and they're about as far apart as they've ever been," says M.S. Howells strategist Brian Reynolds. That creates a great arbitrage situation for deal makers, who get to issue expensive-looking bonds to buy cheap-looking stock. As long as that dynamic persists, the deals will continue and stocks will have at least one reason to rally.
Given the theoretical link between equity and credit risk and active arbitrage activity, one would expect the equity and credit markets to be closely linked. Instead, recent empirical research finds stock returns and changes in credit spreads to be weakly correlated. In a regression of monthly changes in credit spreads on the stock returns and other variables consistent with the structural framework, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) find adjusted R 2 s of the order of 17% to 34%, leading them to conclude, "Given that structural framework models risky debt as a derivative security which in theory can be perfectly hedged, this adjusted R 2 seems extremely low." Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) conduct a similar exercise using weekly changes in spreads of credit default swaps, and find that three-quarters of the variation remains unexplained. This low correlation is especially surprising because, on average, the Merton (1974) model does an excellent job of fitting the cross-sectional dispersion of medium horizon credit spreads. In our dataset, a cross-sectional regression of the average five-year credit default swap spread on the firm's average debt ratio and stock return volatility gives an adjusted R 2 of 61%. How then does one explain the low correlations between changes in credit spreads and stock returns? Why does arbitrage activity not create an integrated stock and bond market?
In this paper, we examine whether limits to arbitrage can explain the extent to which the equity and credit markets are integrated. Our focus is on investigating the factors that might impact the amount of capital allocated by arbitrageurs to a relative value or convergence trades across the equity and credit markets. Our motivation to test for limits to arbitrage is two-fold. First, limits to arbitrage have emerged as an important paradigm for explaining market anomalies involving violations of the law of one price, and, therefore, it is a natural hypothesis to investigate. Limits to arbitrage have been invoked for a wide range of anomalies such as the closed end fund discount (Pontiff (1996) ), violations of putcall parity (Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw, (2004) ) and negative stub values (Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2002), Lamont and Thaler (2003) ). 2 The existing literature has not, however, used this paradigm to examine the degree of integration of the corporate equity and credit markets, despite the size and importance of these two markets. Second, evidence on the type of limits impacting the integration of equity and credit markets would provide a direction for the development of next-generation structural models of credit risk.
Existing attempts at making the Merton (1974) model more realistic have largely focused on specifications for the default boundary, recovery, and the stochastic process determining the underlying firm value or leverage. 3 Limits to arbitrage, as these relate to more fundamental assumptions of frictionless markets and full information, potentially pose a more serious challenge that makes it necessary to understand the specific nature of the impediments.
As in the literature (e.g. Shleifer and Summers (1990)), we view convergence trades across the equity and credit markets as risk arbitrage trades rather than the zero-capital, riskless arbitrage modeled in structural models of credit risk. The degree of integration of the two markets will then depend on the arbitrage capital that is allocated to such trades.
The magnitude of perceived possible profits -the "alpha" of the trade" -will increase the arbitrage capital, and the impediments to arbitrage such as costs or risks associated with implementing the covergence trade will reduce the amount of capital. In short, the degree of integration will depend on perceived potential profits as well as the magnitude of the impediments to arbitrage.
The fundamental hypothesis we test is as follows: If limited arbitrage activity impacts the integration of the equity and credit markets, then the co-movement between stock prices and credit spreads will vary in the cross-section of firms with variation in factors determining arbitrage activity. It is reasonable to expect cross-sectional variation as both perceived potential profit opportunities as well as impediments to arbitrage should have firm-specific components. We examine our hypothesis by considering co-movements between firms' stock prices and spreads on the firms' credit default swap. (It is much easier to arbitrage using credit default swaps, and we expect that arbitrageurs like hedge funds use these as opposed to the underlying bonds that are difficult to short.) In a market that is perfectly integrated, we expect a positive (negative) stock return to be associated with a decrease (increase) in the spread. We relate cross-sectional variations in this expected co-movement to the determinants of arbitrage activity, i.e., the potential for profits and the impediments to arbitrage.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that arbitrageurs rely on their specialized, presumably costly, knowledge when deciding to undertake convergence trades. Although it is difficult to directly observe the arbitrageur's private information, we may indirectly proxy for it by the informational sensitivity of the security. The more informationally sensitive the security, the more likely it is that the arbitrageur will be able to trade on his information. To illustrate, consider a capital structure arbitrageur who specializes in analyzing credit risk, and enters into a convergence trade whenever relative bond and stock prices diverge because of, say, noise trader activity in the equity markets. He will be more actively involved in convergence trade for riskier debt than for less risky debt, as the latter, being less informationally sensitive, requires a larger amount of noise trading and stock price movement to have the same impact on the bond price. At an extreme, when the debt is riskless, there is no private information that can make an arbitrageur enter into a convergence trade. In summary, we expect that the more informationally sensitive the firm's debt or equity, the more integrated will be the two markets.
There is now an extensive literature on the costs and risks that impede a convergence trade. Costs include commissions and bid-ask spreads. More generally, we expect liquidity of the underlying securities to impact arbitrage activity. As the convergence trade requires trading both the CDS and the stock, both the liquidity of the equity and credit markets might be relevant. In addition to liquidity risks, an arbitrageur's trading position is subject to fundamental idiosyncratic risk when he cannot form a perfect hedge. For example, an arbitrageur who is betting on a decline in stock prices or credit spreads cannot hedge against the firm-specific risk that the firm might undertake a corporate action that, in fact, does the opposite as, for example, if the firm enters into a leveraged buyout transaction. In addition to liquidity and fundamental idiosyncratic risk, arbitrageurs may, in the shortrun, limit the amount of capital that can be allocated to a convergence trade because of institutional constraints on the availability of risk capital (Merton (1987) In our main set of tests, we relate cross-sectional variation in the integration of the two markets to our three sets of implications. We find extensive support for the hypothesis that the integration between the two markets is impacted by factors impacting arbitrage activity.
First, we find that the informational sensitivity of the underlying debt or equity is a significant determinant of the level of integration. We measure the informational sensitivity of the credit default swap by its riskiness as proxied by equity volatility, debt level, and the rating (whether or not it is above or below investment grade). We also control for the size of the firm. Both equity volatility and rating are consistently significant with signs that indicate that the firm with higher credit risk has more integrated equity and credit markets. We proxy the informational sensitivity of equity by the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecast. We find that the greater the dispersion, the greater is the integration of the firms' equity and credit market. Thus, both the informational sensitivity of the stock and the credit default swap impacts the correlation between the two markets.
Second, we test whether lower liquidity in either credit or equity markets makes it more difficult to arbitrage. We find significant support for this implication, finding that the liquidity of the credit market is significant in linking the two markets. Equity market liquidity has almost no effect, suggesting that the liquidity of the credit market imposes the binding constraint.
Third, we test whether the the two markets are less integrated with greater idiosyncratic risk. Controlling for the total risk, we find that a decrease in the idiosyncratic risk of the firm makes the two markets more integrated. In summary, limits to arbitrage have an impact on the integration of the two markets.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample and the construction of impediment measures. Section 3 examines the relative movement of CDS spreads and stock prices over different intervals. Section 4 empirically tests whether impediments to arbitrage have significant impact on the correlation between credit spread changes and stock returns. Conclusions are in Section 5.
Data and Measures

Descriptive Statistics
Our dataset consists of credit default swap spreads, equity prices, and relevant accounting information for U.S. non-financial firms over the period January 2, 2001 and December 31,
2005.
We obtain daily price data for the five-year credit default swap (CDS) from Markit Group, the leading industry source for credit pricing data. Markit Group collects CDS quotes from a large number of contributing banks, and then cleans it to remove outliers and stale prices. The obligors that enter our sample are components of the Dow Jones CDX North America Investment Grade (CDX.NA.IG), the Dow Jones CDX North America High Yield (CDX.NA.HY) and the Dow Jones North America Crossover (CDX.NA.XO) indices. 4 We specifically choose firms that form part of the index to ensure continuity in price quotes.
We match the data from Markit to CRSP and Compustat manually to construct an initial sample of 224 North American non-financial firms, from which we eliminate 22 firms that were delisted over this period and another 2 firms that had less than a year of data of spread and stock price data. Our final sample set consists of 200 firms. Of the 200 obligors in our dataset, 95 obligors have an average rating of investment grade (AAA, AA, A, and BBB), and 105 obligors are below investment grade (BB, B, and CCC). 5 We obtain daily equity prices, returns, outstanding number of shares, and other equity information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We use the cumulative factor to adjust prices and outstanding number of shares for split events. 6 The accounting data is obtained from the COMPUSTAT Quarterly database. We construct three firm level variables: size, leverage, and equity return volatility. The market capitalization (size) of the firm is calculated as the product of stock prices and outstanding number of shares. Leverage is computed as the ratio of book debt value to the sum of book debt value and market capitalization. The book value of debt is defined as the sum of long term debt (data51) and debt in current liabilities (data45). Equity volatility is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock return over the sample period. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the CDS spreads and firm characteristics. In computing these statistics, we first average over our sample period for each obligor, and then take a second average across all the firms. The first panel presents the descriptive statistics for the 5-year CDS spreads. The mean spread across the entire sample is 215 basis points (bps). The mean across investment grade firms is 86 bps while that of the high yield is much larger at 331 bps. The second panel presents the statistics for the firm size, 4 The IG index consists of 125 equally weighted investment grade entities, the HY of 100 equally weighted entities of rating below investment grade, and the XO of 35 equally weighted entities with cross-over ratings. Cross-over ratings are defined as a rating of BBB/Baa by one of S&P and Moody's, and in the BB/Ba rating category by the other, or a rating in the BB/Ba category by one or both S&P and Moody's.
5 Markit provides information on both the average agency rating and an implied rating. We use the agency rating averaged over our sample period when available. When the agency rating is unavailable, we use the implied rating.
6 Split events usually include stock splits, stock dividends, and other distributions with price factors. Outstanding number of shares is only adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends. 'cfacpr' and 'cfacshr' are adjustment factors for prices and outstanding number of shares in the CRSP. measured in billions of dollars. The average size of investment grade firms in our sample is $22.3 billion versus $4.9 billion for high yield firms. The third panel reports the statistics for equity volatility. Across the entire sample, the average equity volatility is 42%. The average for the equity volatility for investment grade firms is 33%, while the corresponding statistic for high yield firms is 50%. The last panel reports descriptive statistics for the leverage. As expected, high yield firms have much higher leverage than investment grade firms. The overall mean leverage across all firms in our sample is 0.29.
In Figure 1 , for each firm we plot the mean CDS spread over the sample period against the firm's average leverage and equity volatility. Consistent with the basic Merton (1974) model, the spread is significantly correlated with the volatility and the leverage. In fact, a linear regression of the mean CDS spread on these variables gives an adjusted R 2 of 61%,
Analysts' Forecast Dispersion
Analysts' earnings forecasts are obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) detail file. As noted by Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), I/B/E/S uses a split adjustment factor to adjust historical analysts' forecasts and then rounds the estimate to the nearest cent. We unadjust the forecasts using the adjustment factor provided by I/B/E/S. The unadjusted analysts forecasts are used to construct the forecast dispersion.
For each analyst, the most recent 1-year forecast closest to the end of the first quarter (March 31st) is used. The dispersion is then defined as the standard deviation across the earnings forecasts scaled by the year-end stock price. If the stock has a price less than five dollars, then the observation is excluded from the sample. For each firm, the average of the yearly forecast dispersion in the sample period is used in the regressions.
Liquidity Measures
We construct liquidity measures for both the equity and credit markets. We use daily stock price data from CRSP to construct stock market liquidity measures. price * sharevolume/|return| from daily data for each firm over our sample period. The time-series mean of the daily estimate is then used as our measure. The higher the square root of Amivest measure, the higher the liquidity of the stock. The zero return proportion is calculated as the ratio of the number of days with zero returns to the total number of days with non-missing observations. Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) finds that the zero return proportion is strongly correlated with transaction costs. The larger the zero proportion measure, the lower the liquidity.
We introduce two new credit maket liquidity measures. Our first measure is based on the number of contributors that provide quotes to Markit on any given date. As contributors are required by Markit to have firm tradeable quotes, the greater the number of contributors, the greater should be the liquidity of the credit default swap. Thus, we define "market depth" as the mean of the daily number of contributors for each firm. Second, analogous to the equity liquidity measure, we use the proportion of zero spread changes, (Zspread), defined as the ratio of zero daily spread changes to the total number of non-missing daily CDS changes. As with the equity market measure, a larger proportion of zero credit spread changes indicates lower liquidity.
Idiosyncratic Risk
We construct our measure of idiosyncratic risk from the the standard market model. We first regress the stock's excess returns,
using daily data over our sample period of 2001 to 2005. Next, following Ferreira and Laux (2007), we compute the ratio of the idiosyncratic volatility to the total volatility for each stock i as
The idiosyncratic measure Idiosync is then defined as the logistic transformation,
We also defined a second measure based on the Fama-French three-factor model, but do not report the results as they were identical to those from the market model. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the liquidity and idiosyncratic risk measures. On average, the composite quote of the 5-year CDS spread is constructed from 9
contributors. The mean of the proportion of zero spread changes (0.22) is much larger than the mean of the proportion of zero returns (0.02), which reflects the fact that the equity market is much more liquid than the CDS market.
Co-movements of CDS Spreads and Stock Prices
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) and Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) document that the correlation between stock returns and changes in spreads are low, inconsistent with structural models. We provide corroborative evidence using our data set.
Although structural models provide a precise relation between changes in underlying firm value and corresponding changes in bond and stock prices, their application requires making assumptions about the underlying model and its parameters. Instead, we make use of a common implication of structural models (e.g. Merton (1974) ) that when the stock and bond are viewed as contingent claims on the underlying firm, the "delta" of both are positive. Unless there are wealth transfers between the stock and bondholders (as, for example, when dividend or investment policies change) an increase (decrease) in firm value increases (decreases) both the stock and bond prices. That is, over any given interval, stock prices and CDS spreads should move in opposite directions. Table 3 reports the number of times stock prices and CDS spreads move in the same and opposite directions over different time horizons, ranging from 5 business days to 50 business days. In addition, we also report the average absolute change in CDS spread and stock return for each direction of movement.
From the table, it is evident that stock prices and CDS spreads do not always move in opposite directions. At a weekly frequency, stock prices and CDS spreads co-move as predicted only 53.8% of the times. As the time-horizon increases, the co-movement of stocks and CDS spreads is closer to theory, but even at a frequency of 50 business days, the co-movement is as predicted only two-thirds of the times. On average, co-movements for firms with below investment grade rating is closer to theory than for investment grade firms, but not by much. At a weekly (monthly) frequency of 5 (25) The proportion of co-movements that are in line with theory should be related to larger changes in spreads and stock prices than the co-movements opposite to theory. Table 3 reports the average absolute change in CDS spreads and stock prices for each direction of co-movement. At every horizon, when the co-movement is in line with theory, the average change in stock prices or CDS spreads is higher than the corresponding statistics when the co-movement is opposite. For instance, at a horizon of 25 business days for opposite movements, the average change in CDS spreads across all firms in our sample is 40.7 basis points and the average change in stock prices is 9.9%. In contrast, the average change in CDS spreads and stock prices for movements in the same direction is respectively 20.9 basis points and 6.4%. We observe a similar pattern across every horizon and for each of our sub-samples. Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that co-movements in the two markets are impacted by costs of arbitrage activity.
An alterative hypothesis that could potentially explain why stock and CDS spreads move in the same direction is that there are wealth transfers between stock and bond-holders.
Wealth transfers can occur when a firm changes its corporate policies. For example, an increase in dividends would result in transfer of wealth from the bond-holders to the shareholders, resulting in an increase in the stock price and a concomitant decline in the bond
price. An increase in the volatility of the investment would likewise result in such wealth transfer. However, we still observe that co-movements where stock prices and CDS spreads move in the same direction are about 40% of the total observations at a weekly or monthly frequency. Given that firms do not change dividend or investment policies frequently, it appears unlikely that all such co-movements are related to news of such changes in corporate policies. Instead of pursuing the hypothesis of potential wealth transfers, we focus on providing direct evidence relating the integration of the two markets to factors determining arbitrage activity.
Integration of Equity and Credit Markets and Limits to Arbitrage
In this section, we relate the correlation between stock returns and CDS spread changes to factors that determine the level of arbitrage activity. Our measure of correlation is the Kendall tau, 7 which has a natural interpretation of measuring the concordance of stock returns and changes in CDS spread. Table 4 provides a summary of the correlation coefficients measured over intervals of 5 to 50 business days. the correlation coefficient increases with interval, indicating increasing concordance of stock returns with changes in CDS spreads in longer horizon, consistent with Table 3 . In addition, there is a substantial range at every interval, indicating large variations in the cross-section.
In our regressions, we use Fisher's z transformation (David (1949) ) of the correlation coefficient,
(1−c) , where c represents the correlation coefficient. However, there is little difference in magnitude between non-transformed and transformed variable. The regression tests are performed for the correlations between stock returns and credit spread changes over 1-day to 50-day intervals. We report the results for 5-, 10-, 25-, and 50-day intervals, corresponding to weekly, bi-weekly, monthly and bi-monthly intervals.
Informational Sensitivity of Debt and Equity
In the absence of any costs or other frictions, every mis-pricing is arbitraged. However, in the presence of information and transaction costs, it is not profitable to detect and trade every relative mis-pricing between the equity and credit markets. The level of arbitrage activity in the market will depend on the expected magnitude of potential profit opportunities, the "alpha" of the convergence trade. In the cross-section, the likelihood that it is profitable for the arbitrageur to implement a trade based on his private information will be impacted by the informational sensitivity of the stock and credit default swap.
We proxy the informational sensitivity of the credit default swap by the riskiness of the firm's debt. As discussed earlier, the magnitude of the spread depends strongly on the volatility and debt level of the firm. We use the equity volatility and debt levels are proxies for the riskiness of the debt. In addition, we also include a dummy variable for whether the rating of the firm is above or below investment grade. We also include the size of the firm as a control.
In univariate regressions that we do not report here, we find the equity volatility and the debt level are consistently significant with a negative coefficient. That is, the higher the volatility and higher the debt, the closer is the correlation between the two markets to -1. Analysts' forecasts dispersion is also consistently signifcant with the expected negative sign. Thus, all the variables proxying for the informational sensitivity of the equity and debt are significant with the correct sign. The size of the firm is not consistently significant.
On average, the variables that have the highest R 2 in the univariate regressions are equity volatility and analysts' forecast dispersion. Table 5 reports the results of the multivariate regression. We include a dummy variable for investment grade, to control for the possibility that the equity volatility and debt level may not completely account for the change of riskiness from investment grade to below investment grade. We report four regressions, corresponding to each of our intervals, weekly, bi-weekl, monthly, and bi-monthly. Overall, we find that the informational sensitivity of both the stock and debt have an impact on the correlation of the equity and credit markets.
In three of the four intervals, equity volatility, rating, and analysts' forecast dispersion are signifcant at 99% level. After controling for equity volatility and rating, the debt level is insignificant. All of these variables have the expected negative sign, indicating that the greater the informational sensitivity, the closer is the correlation to -1. The size also enters with a negative sign in three of the four intervals. The R 2 of the regressions range from 17% to 35% suggesting that the informational sensitivity of the underlying securities plays a very important role in determining the integration of the equity and credit markets.
In much of the existing empirical literature, the focus has been on understanding costs and risks that inhibit arbitrage activity. We believe we are the first to observe that it is just as important, if not more, to consider the sensitivity of the securities to an arbitrageur's private information. Below, where we consider the role of liquidity and idiosyncratic risk, we continue to control for the informational sensitivity by including the most significant variables in the regression. 8 
Liquidity
Illiquidity of a market increases transaction costs as well as risks of a convergence trade.
With increasing illiquidity, we expect lower integration and, therefore, a less negative correlation coefficient. We consider both the liquidity of the equity and credit markets. Table 6 presents the impact of the credit market liquidity on the correlation between stock returns and spread changes. Panel A reports the results for the credit market depth, where the market depth is the average number of data providers to the Markit database for the firm over the sample period. We find this proxy for liquidity is significant for three of our four regressions. For all four of the regressions, the sign of the coefficient is negative, indicating that the greater the number of contributors, the more integrated the market.
Thus, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that greater liquidity implies more integration and correlations closer to -1. Panel B reports the results for our second proxy, the proportion of zero spread changes. The zero spread is a measure of illiquidity, i.e., higher the proportion, the more illiquid the market market. We also find this measure to be significant for each of our regressions with the correct sign. Both the two measures are positively correlated as would be expected -the more contributors, the less likely we are to see a zero change in spread. When we include both the market depth and the zero proportion in one regression, we find the significance of depth is absorbed by the zero proportion. It appears that the zero proportion is a more direct measure of illiquidity. Overall, we find strong evidence that the liquidity of the CDS market impacts the integration between the two markets. Table 7 presents the results for the measures of equity market liquidity on the correlations. We provide results for two measures, the square root of the Amivest measure and the proportion of zero stock returns. Overall, we find less evidence of the impact of equity market liquidity. The coefficients are either insignificant or very weakly significant. We also test for other proxies (including the Amihud measure) and not find them significant.
Overall, the evidence indicates that, in our sample, equity liquidity has little impact on the integration of the two markets, and that it is the risks and costs imposed by trading in the credit markets that determines the integration of the two markets.
Idiosyncratic Risk
In considering measures of idiosyncratic risk, we have to be careful to control for the total risk of the firm. As discussed earlier, an increase in the equity volatility increases the informational sensitivity of the credit risk, and thus makes arbitrage activity more likely.
However, for a given riskiness of the firm, a higher level of idiosyncratic risk would deter arbitrage activity (Pontiff (2006) ). This consideration is also important in how we construct our measure of idiosyncratic risk. We do by estimating the R 2 from a linear regression using the market model, and then taking the logistic transformation as noted in equation (3). Our hypothesis is that the greater the amount of idiosyncratic risk, the lower the integration, and less negative the correlation. Table 8 presents the impact of idiosyncratic risk on the correlations. For each of the four intervals, the coefficient on the idiosyncratic risk is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is positive, consistent with the hypothesis that a higher level of idiosyncratic risk will make make the correlation closer closer to 0 than -1. The coefficient to volatility remains significant and negative. Thus, although the total volatility of the stock return makes the equity and credit markets more integrated, the idiosyncratic component makes it less integrated. For robustness, we also considered the idiosyncratic risk component estimated from the Fama-French three-factor model and found identical results.
Our results add to the literature that observes that idiosyncratic risk has a significant impact in capital markets. Pontiff (2006) provides an overview of this literature.
Conclusion
We examine whether limits to arbitrage impacts the integration between equity and credit markets. If the costs and risks of undertaking cross-market arbitrages are important, then we expect that the level of integration will vary in the cross-section of firms. We test and find extensive support for this implication. First, we find that firms whose securities are more informationally sensitive have more integrated markets. This is consistent with the notion that, with limited capital, arbitrageurs will prefer focusing on markets where their private information is more likely to be valuable. Second, we find that liquidity of the underlying credit market is significant in determining the level of integration. Markets are less integrated as the credit default swap becomes less liquid. In contrast, equity market liquidity does not appear to important. Finally, idiosyncratic risk matters. Firms with greater idiosyncratic risk, after controlling for total volatility, are less integrated.
Should the low correlation between credit spreads and stock returns be construed as damaging evidence against structural models of credit risk? Our results provide both good and bad news. On one hand, it indicates that there may be little to be gained in developing structural models with more realistic default boundaries or stochastic processes for modeling the underlying firm value. On the other hand, it also indicates that that research should increasingly focus on the development of models that explicitly allow for the role of arbitrageurs. The latter appears to be a far more difficult task as it relates to fundamental assumptions regarding our markets. Leverage is the ratio of book debt value to the sum of book debt value and market capitalization. For each obligor, we first compute the time-series mean of its (daily) 5-year CDS spreads, (daily) market capitalization, and (quarterly) leverage, and then compute the statistics in the cross-section. The equity volatility is computed as the annualized standard deviation of daily returns across the five-year sample period. Table 3 : Co-movement of CDS Spreads and Stock Prices
The table reports the direction of movement between CDS spreads and stock prices reported as a percentage of total observations at a given sampling interval. |∆CDS| is the mean of absolute spread changes. |∆P/P | is the mean of absolute stock returns. "Obs" is the total number of non-missing pairs of spread and price changes in the sample. , where korr is the Kendall correlation. S.Amivest is sqrt(abs(return)/(abs(price) * sharevolume)). The average of the daily values is computed as the measure for the firm in the sample period. Zprop is the proportion of zero daily stock returns among all the non-missing observations in the sample period. F oredisp is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts scaled by the period-end stock price. Eqvol is the annualized equity volatility in the sample period. Lnmcap is the log of the market capitalization. Rating is a dummy variable for investment grade. t-values are reported in parenthesis; ** and * indicates significance at 5% and 10%, respectively. 
